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THE RAINBOW BRIDGE CASE AND
RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN RESERVED AREAS*

Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong1 was an action against the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Secretary of the
Interior to compel them to limit the surface level of Lake Powell
behind the Glen Canyon Dam so as to avoid encroaching on Rainbow
Bridge National Monument.2 The United States District Court for
the District of Utah granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and issued the injunction prayed for.' The Tenth Circuit reversed, 4 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.'
It is the purpose of this comment to advance and test the thesis
that an invasion of a reserved area by a reclamation project will be
permitted by Congress when two or more projects threatening to
invade different reserved areas are proposed to Congress simultaneously. The politics of reclamation are complex, 6 and the structural
element focused on here will be just one of a number of considerations in the tactical assessment of future reclamation proposals. The
holding of the Rainbow Bridge case and its impact as a political
precedent will be analyzed in the course of testing this thesis against
the several reclamation controversies involving reserved areas that
have concerned the federal government since the turn of the century.
MULTIPLE-PROJECT CONTROVERSIES
There have been two multiple-project controversies against which
the thesis can be tested. The first such controversy involved the
*For the purposes of this comment "reserved areas" include national parks, national
monuments, and wilderness areas. Compare the definitions of the National Park System at
16 U.S.C. § lc (1960) and the National Wilderness Preservation System at 16 U.S.C.
§ § 1131(a), (c), 1132 (Supp.1974).
1. 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973).
2. Rainbow Bridge National Monument was created by Presidential Proclamation of May
30, 1910, 36 Stat. 2703, pursuant to the Antiquities Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 225, § 2
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 431,(1960)). A description of Rainbow Bridge can be found in the
district court opinion, Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 360 F. Supp. 165, 169-177 (D.C.
Utah 1973).

3. 360 F. Supp. 165, at 194 (D.C. Utah 1973).

4. 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973).

5. Friends of the Earth v. Stamm, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974).
6. See, e.g., H. Ingram, Patterns of Politics in Water Resource Development: A Case
Study of New Mexico's Role in the Colorado River Basin Bill (1969); 0. Stratton & P.
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Colorado River Storage Act 7 of 1956 which resulted in the flooding
of Rainbow Bridge National Monument. The second involved the
Colorado River Basin Project Act 8 of 1968 which authorized a
reservoir in the Gila Wilderness.
A. Rainbow Bridge
The Colorado River Storage Act of 1956 authorized Glen Canyon
Dam. The maximum level of the reservoir to be created by the dam
was such that with the reservoir at full capacity the water would be
well within Rainbow Bridge National Monument and about 48 feet
deep under Rainbow Bridge itself, but still some twenty-five feet
below the actual base of the bridge. 9 The initial Report of 1950'0
for the development of the Upper Colorado River Basin, which was
circulated by the Bureau of Reclamation' ' after a decade of study,
proposed the eventual construction of ten major dams on the Colorado and its major tributaries, the San Juan, the Gunnison, the
Yampa, and the Green. 2 In particular, the Bureau proposed the
construction on the Green River of the Echo Park Dam which would
flood a significant part of Dinosaur National Monument.'" Ultimately, the Bureau and the Department of the Interior recommended only Glen Canyon and Echo Park to Congress for construction in the initial phase of development. '
Both Glen Canyon Dam and Echo Park Dam threatened national
monuments, but the opposition to Echo Park was the great battle of
the time. Echo Park was strongly endorsed by the Bureau for the
reason that it was second only to Glen Canyon in its power production capability. It would therefore be important in meeting the
Bureau's schedules for repayment of construction costs.' ' The other
Sirotkin, The Echo Park Controversy (1959); W. Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation (1973);
and R. Berkman & W. Viscusi, eds., Damming the West (1973).

7. Act of April 11, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-485, 70 Stat. 105 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ § 620, 620a, 620b, 620d, 620e-620o (1964).
8. Act of Sept. 30, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (codified in scattered sections
of 43 U.S.C.).
9. See 485 F.2d at 3; notes 28-31, infra, and accompanying text.
10. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Storage Project and Participating Projects
(1950), printed in H.R. Doc. No. 364, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59-290 (1954) [hereinafter cited

as 1950 Report].
11. Descriptions of the Bureau of Reclamation can be found in Warne, supra note 6;
Berkman & Viscusi, supra note 6; and Stratton & Sirotkin, supra note 6, at 9-12.
12. 1950 Report, "Report of the Regional Director," at 3-9.
13. Id.; see id., "Statement of the National Park Service," at 37-43. Dinosaur National
Monument was created by Presidential Proclamation of Oct. 4, 1915, 39 Stat. 1752, and
was enlarged by Presidential Proclamation of July 14, 1938, 53 Stat. 2454.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 1087, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1956), printed in 1956 U.S. Code
Cong.& Ad.News 2346, 2365.
15. Stratton & Sirotkin, supra note 6, at 27, 31, 32.
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advantages of Echo Park included its large storage capacity, second
again only to Glen Canyon, and its capability for regulating river
flow to increase power production downstream.' 6 Utah strongly
supported Echo Park because it was the only way for Utah to obtain
the 500,000 acre feet of water allocated to it annually under the
Upper Colorado River Compact of 1948.' 7
Echo Park was opposed by the National Park Service and a coalition of more than thirty conservation organizations because of the
considerable impairment to the monument that would result and
because of the danger of setting a precedent for the exploitation of
the National Park System.' 8 In addition, there was broad-based
opposition to the whole Report of 1950, including Glen Canyon,
because of the interest-free financing of the irrigation components of
the plan. 1 9 California opposed the whole plan in order to protect the
quantity and quality of its Colorado River water and its sources of
hydroelectric power at Hoover and other Lower Basin dams.2 0 In
contrast, everyone appears to have been convinced by the Bureau's
assurances that protection of Rainbow Bridge National Monument
would be simple and inexpensive and would be undertaken as an
integral part of the Glen Canyon project. 2' Consequently, Glen Canyon was authorized and Echo Park was not.2 2
The question before the courts in Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong was not whether Lake Powell would damage Rainbow Bridge,
but whether Congress had made a decision to allow the reservoir to
come up under the bridge.2 ' Section 3 of the Storage Act reads as
follows: "It is the intention of Congress that no dam or reservoir
constructed under the authorization of this Act shall be within any
national park or monument." 2 4 Invoking the plain meaning rule of
statutory interpretation,2 the plaintiffs alleged that this section was
being violated by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation
and the Secretary of the Interior and that those officials should be
16. Id. at 6, 27, 31, 32.
17. Id. at 27, 34, 35. The Upper Colorado River Compact is set out at 63 Stat. 31. The
Upper Basin states are Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico. The dividing point
between upper and lower basins is Lee Ferry, Arizona.
18. Stratton & Sirotkin, supra note 6, at 16-23, 36-40.
19. Id. at 32-34, 79-85.

20. Id. at 86-91.
21. Hearings on H.R. 270, H.R. 2836, H.R. 3383, H.R. 3384, & H.R. 4484 Before the
Subcomm. on Irrigation & Reclamation of the House Comm. on Interior& Insular Affairs,

84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, pt. 1, at 304-308 (1955). See Brower, supra note 90.
22. 70 Stat. 106, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1964).
23. Brief for Appellants at 2, Brief for Appellees at 2, Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong,
485 F.2d 1 (1973); 485 F.2d at 2.

24. 70 Stat. 107,43 U.S.C. § 620b (1964).
25. Brief for Appellees, supra note 23, at 20.
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enjoined therefrom. Arguing by syllogism, they pointed to the facts
that Lake Powell is a "reservoir constructed under the authorization
of the Act" and that Rainbow Bridge and the surrounding 160 acres
are a national monument. Therefore, it was argued, the federal defendants were violating the intent of Congress declared in section 3.2 6
The plain meaning rule, however, should not force the court to
put on blinders. As Justice Cardozo once wrote, "the meaning of a
statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the
parts together and in their relation to the end view. '"27 The "end
view" of the 1956 Act was the construction and operation of Glen
Canyon Dam and participating reclamation projects.2 8 If this is true,
what meaning did the term "Glen Canyon Dam" have in Congress at
that time? This question is answered readily by the Report of 1950
and the committee reports which show clearly that Glen Canyon
Dam was to be a 700-foot concrete barrier on the Colorado River
fifteen miles downstream from the Arizona-Utah border. 2 9 A
700-foot dam at Glen Canyon would create a reservoir that would
partially flood the monument. 3 0 The continual Congressional appropriations during the years of construction demonstrate that the end
view remained unchanged throughout. 3 1
Thus, there is an apparent conflict between the authorization of
the 700-foot dam, the natural consequence of which would be to
back water into Rainbow Bridge National Monument, and the declaration in section 3 of the Act that Congress intended that no reservoir
should enter a national monument. In order to resolve this apparent
conflict and to carry out fully Justice Cardozo's advice it is necessary
to refer to the following language in section 1: Provided further,
That as part of the Glen Canyon Unit the Secretary of the Interior
shall take adequate protective measures to preclude impairment of
the Rainbow Bridge National Monument." 3' 2 At the time the foregoing language was enacted Congress had before it the proposal of
26. Id. at 19-5 8.
27. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,439 (1934) (dissenting opinion).
28. This is clear from reading the entire Act, 70 Stat. 105-111. The express purposes of
the act are set out in the text accompanying note 46, infra.The committee reports, e.g.,
H.R. Rep. No. 1087, supra note 14, are in accord.
29. 1950 Report, "Substantiating Materials," at 49; H.R. Rep. No. 1087, supra note 13,
at 9; 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2352.
30. See 1950 Report, "Substantiating Materials," at 49 and id., "Statement of the National Park Service," at 9-11.
31. The yearly appropriations from 1956 through 1959 can be found at 70 Stat. 474, at
477; 71 Stat. 415, at 420; 72 Stat. 50, at 58; 72 Stat. 1572, at 1576;and 73 Stat. 491,at
496. See note 48, infra, for appropriations after 1959.
32. 70 Stat. 106,43 U.S.C. § 620 (1964).
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the Bureau of Reclamation to build a barrier dam below the monument to prevent the reservoir waters from entering the area. Such a
solution was possible because the water would be contained in the
narrow canyon leading to the bridge. ' To take care of the flow of
flash floods down the canyon spanned by the rainbow a second dam
above the monument with a diversion tunnel to direct the flow into a
neighboring canyon was contemplated. 4 In 1956 it was estimated
that the protective works would cost at most four million dollars.' S
Final plans for the protective works had not been formulated, however, at the time of the passage of the Act.' 6
Thus, the protective works alluded to in the proviso of section 1
would make compatible the 700-foot dam at Glen Canyon and the
declaration of congressonal intent in section 3 that no reservoir,
namely, Lake Powell, should enter a national monument, namely,
Rainbow Bridge. In short, a comprehensive reading of the statute
itself, with reference to the committee reports only to explain the
bald terms of the statute, dictates the conclusion that Congress included the general intention language of section 3 upon the assumption that Lake Powell water would be kept out of Rainbow Bridge
National Monument by a barrier dam. There is no indication that
Congress entertained the possibility that the level of Lake Powell
would be held below the design level of Glen Canyon Dam in order
to comply with section 3: the water would be kept out by protective
works or not at all. The total capacity of the lake, with the waters
under Rainbow Bridge, is estimated to be 27,000,000 acre feet.3
The capacity with the waters at the level of the lower boundary of
the monument is about 12,751,000 acre feet, 3 8 or approximately 47
percent of total capacity. With the water at the lower level, many
industrial, municipal, and private water consumers would be deprived
of water already contracted to them. 3 9
In addition, the feasibility of the financing system incorporated in
the 1956 act was not such as would allow Glen Canyon to operate at
half capacity. The revenues derived from the sale of electrical power
generated by the turbines in the dam were to defray much of the
'

33. For a description of the bridge and the surrounding area, see the district court
opinion, supra note 3, at 169-177.
34. Hearings, supra note 21, at 305.
35. Id. at 306.
36. Id.
37. 485 F.2d at 4.
38. In normal years, another million acre feet would have to be discharged to ensure that
the spring run-off would not cause the reservoir to enter the monument. 485 F.2d at 4, 10.
39. Interview with Paul Bloom, Counsel to the New Mexico State Engineer and to the
New Mexico Interstate Stream Comm'n., in Santa Fe, N.M., Sept. 18, 1973.
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cost of its own construction 4 0 and operation as well as that of the
participating projects. 4 The amount of power generated by the
turbines, however, depends on the head of water behind the dam. 4 2
The head of water would be reduced 94 feet to meet the limiation
proposed by the plaintiffs.4 Why build it to its projected height of
700 feet if there were a foreseeable possibility that it would be only
half-used? The courts must assume that Congress has acted reasonably.4
Holding down the water level would also appear to contravene
other provisions of the 1956 Act. Section 7 requires that the hydroelectric powerplants be operated "so as to produce the greatest practicable amount of power and energy that can be sold at firm power
and energy rates."'4

1

And operation at half capacity would impair

the attainment of the purposes of the Act stated in section 1:
That, in order to initiate the comprehensive development of the
water resources of the Upper Colorado River Basin, for the purposes,
among others, of regulating the flow of the Colorado River, storing
for beneficial consumptive use, making it possible for the States of
the Upper Basin to utilize, consistently with the provisions of the
Colorado River Compact the apportionments made to and among
them in the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, respectively, providing for the reclamation of arid
and semiarid land, for the control of floods, and for the generation
of hydroelectric power, as an incident of the foregoing purposes, the
Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized ... 46
And finally, section 13 expresses the objective of attaining "the fullest practicable use of the waters of the Upper Colorado River
system." 4
40. The dam was projected to cost $421,270,000. H.R. Rep. No. 1087, supra note 14, at
14; 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2358.
41. 70 Stat. 107, 43 U.S.C. § 620d (1964); 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2354-2359, 2376-2386, 2396-2406, 2423; Stratton & Sirotkin, supra note 6, at 31-34,
79-85.
42. See 485 F.2d at 10; Stratton & Sirotkin, supra note 6, at 27.
43. The maximum height of the reservoir above sea level is 3700 ft. The lower boundary
of the monument is at 3606 ft. 485 F.2d at 3.
44. See the cases in which the courts have construed statutes so as to make them
constitutional because to do otherwise would be to assume unreasonable action on the part
of congress: e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932), Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297
U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
45. 70 Stat. 109, 43 U.S.C. § 620f (1964).
46. 70 Stat. 106, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1964). Section 14 directs the Secretary to comply
with the provisions of the Colorado River Compact. The compact is set out at 70 Cong. Rec.
324, 325 (1928).
47. The section reads in full:
In planning the use of, and in using credits from, net power revenues available
for the purpose of assisting in the pay-out costs of participating projects herein
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Consequently, Congress was in effect saying that water would be
allowed to flood the canyon beneath Rainbow Bridge when it began

to incorporate the following proviso into appropriations acts beginning with fiscal year 1961: "Provided, That no part of the funds
herein appropriated shall be available for construction or operation

of facilities to prevent waters of Lake Powell from entering any
national monument."'4' 8 Construction of the dam to its full 700-foot
height was well along at the time the first proviso was enacted.4 9
The proviso was apparently the result primarily of two facts which

had come to light after the passage of the 1956 Act: (1) water
standing beneath Rainbow Bridge would not damage it structurally,s 0 and (2) the cost of protective works would be approximately

$20 million, a tremendous increase above the original estimate of not
more than four million dollars.' I
In sum, the 1956 Act appears to have tentatively authorized the
exclusion of the waters of Lake Powell by means of protective
works, if at all, and not by limiting the level of the reservoir to half
capacity. Consequently, when Congress enacted the appropriations
provisos, it was making a conscious decision to flood the monument,
and one must conclude that the Tenth Circuit was correct in its
judgment. The court went to unnecessary lengths beyond the foregoing considerations, however. The 1956 Act, the appropriations
provisos, and the committee reports are sufficient to dispose of the
issue; there was no need to rely on collateral references in a later act
of Congress indicating an assumption that Glen Canyon would be
5
operated at full capacity. 2

Exception must be taken to the court's opinion for its failure to
take up a strong argument made by the plaintiffs. They pointed out
and hereafter authorized in the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming, the Secretary shall have regard for the achievement within each of
said States of the fullest practicable use of the waters of the Upper Colorado
River System, consistent with the apportionment thereof among such States.
70 Stat. 110,43 U.S.C. § 620Q (1964).
48. The appropriations provisos can be found at 74 Stat. 743, at 747; 75 Stat. 722, at
726; 76 Stat. 1216, at 1221; 77 Stat. 844, at 849; 78 Stat. 682, at 687; 79 Stat. 1096, at
1102; 80 Stat. 1002, at 1008; 81 Stat. 471, at 476; 82 Stat. 705, at 710; 83 Stat. 323,at
339; 84 Stat. 890, at 896; 85 Stat. 365, at 369; 86 Stat. 621, at 625. On the issue of implied
repeal of substantive legislation by means of appropriations acts, see 54 B. U. L. Rev. 457
(1974).
49. See 485 F.2d at 3.
50. H.R. Rep. No. 1634, 86 Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1960).
51. Id.; S. Rep. No. 1097, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1961).
52. See 485 F.2d at 5, 11. There is no doubt, however, that later acts of Congress can be
relevant to the determination of congressional intent in an earlier act. See New York, P. &
N. R.R. v. Peninsula Produce Exch., 240 U.S. 34, 39 (1916); Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530,541 (1962).
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that Congress had refused to repeal expressly the crucial language of
sections 1 and 3, although amendments to that effect had been urged
on the Congress eight different times.' ' They argued, with precedent,5 1 that this legislative history demonstrated congressional
intent to retain section 3 in full force.5 I Surprisingly, the court
chose not to deal with this argument.
In addition, the court directed the district court to retain jurisdiction of the matter for ten years to allow the plaintiffs to seek
further relief should structural damage to the bridge appear or should
the water levels exceed those assumed by Congress.' 6 By so doing,
the Tenth Circuit is encroaching upon the prerogatives of Congress.
If the scientific information upon which Congress based its actions
turns out to be wrong, it is for Congress, and not the district court,
to decide what adjustments must be made. By its action the court
has also changed the focus of the issue from the protection of the
whole monument (as it was in the 1956 Act) to the protection of the
bridge itself. This is unjustified in view of the narrow question presented to the court. 5 '
B. The Gila Wilderness
In addition to the 1956 Colorado River Storage Act, there has
been one other act of Congress which has authorized the violation of
a reserved area as a result of a multiple-project proposal. That was
the Colorado River Basin Project Act5 8 of 1968, the result of the
celebrated attempt by Arizona and the Bureau of Reclamation to
dam the Grand Canyon.5 9
The 1968 Project Act created the Central Arizona Project (CAP),
capping twenty years of effort by its proponents. 6 0 The core of the
CAP is the Granite Reef Aqueduct through which water is to be
transported from Lake Havasu on the Colorado River behind Parker
53. S. 3180, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S. 175, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 1188,

87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 333, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 1555,90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); S. 307, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 1057, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
H.R. 6255, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
54. Georgia v. Pennsylvania, 324 U.S. 439,457 (1944), cited by the district court at 360
F. Supp. at 190. Compare 1973 Utah L. Rev. 808, 818 (1974) with 54 B. U. L. Rev. 457,

461 n.32 (1974).
55.
56.
57.
58.

Brief for Appellees, supra note 23, at 31, 32.
485 F.2d at 12.
485 F.2d at 13, 14 (dissenting opinion). See text accompanying note 23, supra.
Act of Sept. 30, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (codified in scattered

sections of 43 U.S.C.).
59. See generally Ingram, supra note 6; and Berkman & Viscusi, supra note 6, at
105-130.
60. Ingram, supra note 6, at 20, 21; Berkman & Viscusi, supra note 6, at 108-111.
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Dam up to Phoenix and Tucson on the Central Arizona Plateau. The
water will be raised 900 feet above Lake Havasu by pumps. The

power to operate the pumps was to be generated by two dams on the
Colorado River. One was to be at Bridge Canyon downstream of

Grand Canyon National Park (Hualapai), and the other was to be at
Marble Gorge in the stretch between the Grand Canyon and the Glen
Canyon Dam. The water behind these dams was not intended for
industrial or agricultural uses. The sole purpose of the dams was to
provide electrical power for the pumps and to provide revenue to

offset the cost of the project. 6 1 These dams were ultimately dropped
from the bill in the face of intense opposition by the Sierra Club and

other organizations. 6 2
Although Congress dropped the Grand Canyon dams from the
Project Act, it nevertheless authorized Hooker Dam (or suitable
alternative) on the Gila River in southwestern New Mexico. 6 3
Hooker Dam was not proposed by the backers of the CAP. It was
proposed by New Mexico to make it possible for that state to utilize

its allotment of water on the upper Gila.6" The project will also
provide flood control and recreation. 6"
A dam at the Hooker site would cause the first invasion of a
wilderness area by a reservoir since the enactment of the Wilderness
Act. 6 6 The reservoir, at full capacity, would inundate land in the
Gila Primitive Area and would back water through the Gila Gorge

seven to nine miles into the Gila Wilderness. 6 7 The Gila was the first
wilderness area in the United States, established at the urging of Aldo
Leopold by administrative action in 1924.6 It was incorporated
into the National Wilderness Preservation System by the Wilderness

61. Berkman & Viscusi, supra note 6, at 117, 118.
62. Ingram, supra note 6, at 29-36. The power to operate the pumps is now to come
from the Navajo Power Plant which is being constructed at Page, Arizona, not far from the
Glen Canyon Dam. The plan is to use coal strip mined on the Hopi Indian Reservation.
Berkman & Viscusi, supra note 6, at 118. On Jan. 20, 1969, the day before he left office,
President Johnson created the Marble Canyon National Monument where the Marble Gorge
Dam would have been built. Proclamation 3889, 3 C.F.R. 390 (Supp. 1971), 83 Stat. 924.
63. 82 Stat. 888, 43 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(4) (Supp. 1974).
64. The dam was necessary in order to accommodate the water, in addition to that
allocated to New Mexico by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340
(1964), which Arizona had unwillingly given up to New Mexico in order to obtain Senator
Anderson's support for the whole CAP package. See Ingram, supra note 6, at 57-69.
65. Ingram, supra note 6, at 1.
66. Id. at 70.
67. Id. The Hooker Site itself is downstream of the wilderness area. Id. at 73.
68. Set aside by order of the Chief of Lands and the Chief of Forest Management,
Southwestern Region, U.S. Forest Service (June 3, 1924). See S. Udall, The Quiet Crisis 154
(1963).
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134 acres of
Act. 6 9 It contains approximately 434,000 acres, 7
which would be inundated by the reservoir.?
The conservationist opposition to the dam was subdued in comparison with the fight over the Grand Canyon. The Sierra Club, in
order not to upset their recent victories on the Colorado, was willing
to accept compromise on the Gila .7 2 The Wilderness Society, whose
primary purpose is to portect and enlarge the wilderness system, was
quite concerned, however. 7 3 Their strategy was to present alternaatives to the Hooker site that would not violate the wilderness. 7 4
Their efforts, although less than completely successful, resulted in
the modification of the authorization to read, "Hooker Dam and
Reservoir or suitable alternative." 7 5 If Hooker is built, it will be the
second time that an invasion of a reserved area will have been permitted by Congress when two projects threatening to invade different reserved areas were proposed simultaneously. 7 6
SINGLE-PROJECT CONTROVERSIES
The first attempt to construct a dam and reservoir in a national
park came just after the turn of the century. It involved the Hetch
Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park. The city of San Francisco,
desiring a new source of power and water, proposed to dam the
Tuolumne River and flood the floor of Hetch Hetchy.
The proposal put at odds the two great conservationists of the
time: Gifford Pinchot and John Muir. Pinchot, with the help of
President Theodore Roosevelt, had put a halt to much of the wholesale ravaging of the nation's forests by the timber barons and their
congressional allies.7 ' He was not a purist, however. He fought for
sustained-yield forestry; to him, untrammeled wilderness was a form
of waste. 7 I At hearings on the Hetch Hetchy bill he said:
As we all know, there is no use of water that is higher than the
domestic use ... the fundamental principle of the whole conserva69. See 16 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (Supp. 1974).
70. See Southwestern Region, U.S. Forest Service, Wildernesses in Southwestern National Forests 4 (1974). The adjacent Gila and Black Range Primitive Areas bring the total close
to 734,000 acres.Id. at 4, 5.
71. Letter from Clinton P. Anderson to Henry Zeiler, May 31, 1967,printed in Ingram,
supra note 6, at 80.
72. See Ingram, supra note 6, at 70-75, 82-85.

73. Id. at 71.
74. Id.
75. 82 Stat. 888, 43 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(4) (Supp. 1974).
76. In addition to the presence of water in the wilderness, the recreational uses of the
reservoir may create problems. The Forest Service will have difficulty enforcing its regulations against motorboats in wilderness areas. See 36 C.F.R. § 293.6 (1973).
77. See Udall, supra note 68, at 97-108.
78. Id. at 119,120.
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tion policy is that of use-to take every part of the land and its
resources and put it to that use in which it will best serve the most
people ...

Muir, on the other hand, was a purist. Although he recognized the
need of the country for natural resources, his highest priority was to
preserve the finest areas:
These temple destroyers, devotees of ravaging commercialism,
seem to have a perfect contempt for Nature, and, instead of lifting
their eyes to the God of the Mountains, lift them to the Almighty
Dollar.
Dam Hetch Hetchy! As well dam for water tanks the people's
cathedrals and churches, for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man.

Yosemite was the first scenic reserve created by federal action."'
At the urging of Horace Greeley and Frederick Law Olmstead 8 2
Congress had ceded Yosemite Valley to the State of California in
1864, "for public use, resort, and recreation [and] shall be inalienable for all time."" 3 Subsequently, Muir had persuaded Congress to
create Yosemite National Park surrounding the valley.8 4 Thereafter,
Muir and the newly-established Sierra Club set out to make the
state-owned valley part of the national park. This was accomplished
in 1906.85 The decade of battle over Hetch Hetchy, however, ended
in victory for the reclamationists, 8 6 resulting in the first and, so far,
the last dam and reservoir to be constructed in a national park.
Three years after the authorization of Hetch Hetchy, the National
Park Service was created ;8" and shortly thereafter, in 1920, farming
interests in Idaho proposed to build at their own expense a series of
79. Hearings on H.R. 7207 Before the House Public Lands Comm., 63d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1913), reprinted at 50 Cong. Rec. 3895 (1913).

80. Udall, supra note 68, at 121.
81. Id. at 112.

82. Council on Environmental Quality, Third Annual Report 313 (1972).
83. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 184, § 1, 13 Stat. 325 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 48 (1960).
84. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1263, 26 Stat. 650 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § § 55, 61,471c,
471d (1960)). See Udall, supra note 68, at 113-116.
85. Act of June 11, 1906, Res. 27, 34 Stat. 831 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § § 47, 48
(1960)).
86. Act of Dec. 19, 1913, ch. 41, 38 Stat. 242.
87. Act of Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408, § 1, 39 Stat. 535 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1960)):
The service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal
areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations... by such
means and measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks,
monuments, and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life
therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
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dams in the southwestern part of Yellowstone National Park." 8 The
park at that time had been in existence for almost a half century.
President Grant signed the act making it the first national park in
1872.8 9 Proponents of the bill granting the easments necessary to
construct and maintain the dams and irrigation works described the
proposed reservoir area as 8,000 acres near the center of a 100,000
acre swamp. 9 0 But Stephen Mather, the first director of the National
Park Service, and Horace Albright, Superintendent of Yellowstone,
vigorously opposed the bill. 9
After passing the Senate, it was de9
feated in the House. 2
CONCLUSION
The Rainbow Bridge and Gila Wilderness experiences bear out
empirically the thesis that an invasion of a reserved area by a reclamation project will be permitted by Congress when two or more
projects threatening to invade different reserved areas are proposed
simultaneously. In such situations the projects may, and often will
be, proposed by different interest groups.
More than two tests are needed, of course, to provide statistical
certainty that the thesis is valid. It is necessary, therefore, to examine
the circumstances of each controversy that supports the thesis to
determine how strongly each supports it. The Rainbow Bridge controversy itself does not give strong support to the thesis because it
does not appear to signal a reversal of the long-standing national
policy against such violations of the national park system, 9 ' even
when such violations are proposed simultaneously with proposals of
other violations.
The decision to flood Rainbow Bridge National Monument was
made by Congress when its choices were severely limited. Construction of Glen Canyon Dam began in 1956"4 and was well along by
the time the decision not to build the protective works was made in
1960."5 The dam was already there. An enormous commitment had
88. See 59 Cong. Rec. 5234, 5235,5856-5861 (1920); Third Annual Report, supra note
82, at 319.
89. Act of March 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1960)).
90. 59 Cong. Rec. 5856 (1920) (Rep. Smith of Idaho).
91. Third Annual Report, supra note 75, at 319. But see 59 Cong. Rec. 5857 (1920).
The bills were S. 3895 & H.R. 12466, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920). The text of S. 3895 is
set out at 59 Cong. Rec. 5235 (1920).
92. 59 Cong. Rec. 5235 (1920); Third Annual Report, supra note 82, at 319.
93. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1, supra note 87. Hetch Hetchy is, of course, the one other
exception to that policy.
94. The initial dynamite blast was detonated by remote control by President Eisenhower
on October 15, 1956. Stratton & Sirotkin, supra note 6, at 95, 96.
95. See 485 F.2d at 3.
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already been made. And what was to be lost? As far as Congress
knew, there would be no structural damage to the bridge. Because
they were no longer at the planning stage, the question was no longer
merely whether a national monument should be invaded as opposed
to other means of meeting projected water and power needs. Three
courses of action were open to Congress at that late date: (1) flood
the monument, (2) build protective works around the monument, or
(3) limit the level of the reservoir. That Congress did not choose
either of the last two courses was predictable given (1) the fivefold
increase of the estimated price tag on the protective works to $20
million, (2) the environmental damage that construction of the protective works would entail, (3) the unchallenged geological findings
that the water would not endanger the structural integrity of the
bridge, (4) the considerable expenditures already made at Glen
Canyon, and (5) the considerable reliance even then on the projected
water and power supplies.
It is a further indication that the invasion of Rainbow Bridge
National Monument is a minor exception rather than the harbinger
of a new trend in National Park System policy that Congress has
refused to repeal the general policy language of section 3 of the 1956
9
Storage Act despite many attempts over the years to do so. 6
In addition, if the conservationists in the early 1950's had handled
their opposition differently, water might not have been allowed to
flood the monument. Timing is very crucial in the development of
the coalitions necessary to push reclamation legislation through
Congress, 9 7 so they might have done well to stop passage completely, at least until reliable facts and figures could be developed on
protective works. 9 Indeed, it was imperative that the satisfaction of
the demands of the conservationists not be delayed until great
commitments weighed against them.
Initially, the authorization of Hooker Dam or suitable alternative
may also seen to give only weak support to the thesis in view of the
facts that there is some possibility that the dam will not be built at
96. See note 53, supra.
97. See Ingram, supra note 6, at 66.
98. See text accompanying note 36, supra. The general opinion among environmentalists
today seems to be that the bill should have been stopped completely. David Brower, executive director of the Sierra Club has subsequently lamented:
The conservationists' last chance vanished when the alliance against the Colorado River Storage Project dissolved in ignorance, false assumption, and in
naivete-ignorance about the beauty of the place, false assumption about the
necessity of the dam, and futile hope that the Bureau of Reclamation would
honor an agreement not to impair the National Park System.
Brower, Forewordto F. Leydet, Time and the River Flowing: Grand Canyon at 5 (1964).
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the Hooker site, 9 and even it if is built there, the reservoir will
inundate only .03 percent of the acreage in the Gila Wilderness.
Other facts, however, show that it is a relatively strong precedent.
The mitigating circumstances surrounding the Rainbow Bridge decision in Congress were not present in the Gila controversy. It was
clear at the time of authorization, in view of the compromises agreed
to, that the dam would probably be built at the Hooker site, and that
if it were, the reservoir would violate the wilderness. And in contrast
to the laws governing the National Park System, the Wilderness Act
provides for approval by the President of reservoirs in wilderness
areas without congressional action.' 00 Thus, the national policy
against encroachment on reserved areas by reclamation projects
would seem to be less formidable with regard to the National Wilderness Preservation System than with regard to the National Park
System. Consequently, the validity of the thesis may well depend on
the type of reserved area.
The Yellowstone Park episode supports the obverse of the thesis:
that a proposal to invade a single reserved area should fail. Hetch
Hetchy, on the other hand, does not. Perhaps Hetch Hetchy can be
characterized as an aberration on the basis that it was the earliest
attempt to invade a reserved area, occurring as it did even before the
establishment of the National Park Service. It certainly was not the
beginning of a trend for the national parks, as the Yellowstone and
Grand Canyon controversies have shown. The obverse, then, would
seem to be valid at least for national parks.
The validity of the thesis itself can now be analyzed. It does
describe accurately the outcome of the only reclamation controversies to which it purports to apply. Some modification of it should be
made, however, to take into account the fact that only two situations have arisen so far to which it is directly applicable. Congress
seems to have been acting more straightforwardly in authorizing the
violation of the Gila Wilderness than it was in authorizing the violation of Rainbow Bridge National Monument. It can be said, therefore, that from past experience an invasion of an area within the
National Wilderness Preservation System by a reclamation project
will be permitted by Congress when such invasion is proposed
simultaneously with a proposal to invade another reserved area. An
invasion of an area within a national park or monument in such a
context can be expected only when the normal alternatives open to
Congress are limited.
99. See H.R. Rep. No. 1312, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3666, 3708.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) (Supp. 1974).
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The empirical thesis described here, as noted at the outset, is not
concerned with, and is not a substitute for, the very real and unavoidable political complexities that must be dealt with in reclamation controversies. It is crucial, however, that the consequences of
various alternatives available in the context of one's political strength
be clearly perceived at an early stage. In the Rainbow Bridge controversy, for example, early, and therefore full, consideration
apparently was not given by the conservationists to the environmental impact of constructing protective works in the vicinity of the
bridge. Today, the roads, heavy equipment, and blasting in close
proximity to the arch seem environmentally destructive to a high
degree. Attention to the structural criteria isolated by the thesis
should be helpful in the early planning of overall strategies and in
determining whether, and to what extent, environmental values must
be compromised.
JOHN B. DRAPER

